The
defeat of the Spanish Armada was one of the great turning points of English
history. Before, there was a real possibility that England could suffer another “1066”
and be conquered by a foreign power. Afterwards, Queen Elizabeth I enjoyed
security on her throne and England was set to become a major world power and
the champion of Protestantism in Europe.
The
Armada was a fleet of 132 ships sent by the Spanish king, Philip II, to invade England and seize the throne from Elizabeth. He had been
the husband of Elizabeth’s
half-sister, Queen Mary I, who had died childless in 1558. Mary had sought to return
England
to Roman Catholicism, and Philip had the same end in view.
The
gap of 30 years between Mary’s death and the sending of the Armada is evidence
of the political power game, played by the European nations, which had given
Philip some hope that England might return to Rome by other means (including a
proposal of marriage to Elizabeth!). Elizabeth was a consummate politician and
the mistress of delay and indecision when it suited her. She was thus able to
keep Philip at arms’ length for many years.
Philip
also had other things on his mind, not least the struggle to retain control of
the Spanish Netherlands (modern day Netherlands
and Belgium).
However,
Philip’s patience was sorely tried by the activities of sea captains such as
Francis Drake who behaved virtually as pirates in their attacking of Spanish
ships and colonies. Spain
was the major colonial power in the Americas, and Spanish ships, laden
with gold and other treasure and produce, were easy targets for seamen who were
not easily controlled by their home government, even had that been intended.
The fact that Elizabeth
was happy to accept captured Spanish booty, and the honours bestowed on Drake
and other “pirates”, suggests that little such control was to be expected!
England also began to have colonial
ambitions. In 1584, for example, Walter Raleigh had founded the colony of Virginia, named in
honour of Elizabeth, the “Virgin Queen”. England
and Spain
were therefore brought into conflict as colonial as well as religious rivals.
Preparations
on both sides
The
construction of the Armada began as early as 1585, but there were many delays
and setbacks to its completion. Not the least of these was the action by
Francis Drake in 1587 of sailing into the port of Cadiz and destroying much of
the Spanish fleet. The action was described by Drake as “singeing the King of
Spain’s beard”.
One
thing the Spanish did not have was the element of surprise. The English knew
all about the invasion plans and were well prepared for it when it came, which
was in 1588. The story of Drake insisting on finishing his game of bowls before
taking on the Spanish is probably apocryphal, but it summarises the relaxed
approach that the English were able to take.
The
idea behind the Armada was not to defeat the English at sea, but to carry
troops, some of whom were to travel from Spain but the bulk of whom were to be
transported from the Spanish Netherlands across the English Channel to the
Thames Estuary, where they would be landed and then make a direct assault on
London. Only 22 ships in the Armada fleet were purpose-built warships, the rest
comprising adapted merchant ships of various types.
The
English fleet that confronted the Spanish Armada was similar in composition to
that of the Armada, in that the bulk of the ships were armed merchant vessels
rather than purpose-built warships. These warships were similar in design to
the Spanish galleons but smaller and therefore more manoeuvrable, although
having similar armaments.
One
huge advantage that the English had from the outset was that their commanders
knew what they were doing but the Spanish did not. The English Lord High
Admiral, Howard of Effingham, was both a seaman and a politician, as well as
being a first cousin of Anne Boleyn, Elizabeth’s late mother. He was ably
assisted by Francis Drake, who was a consummate seaman (he had sailed round the
world and been knighted on his return in 1581) who also knew the Spanish inside
out from his frequent skirmishes with them.
On
the other hand, the Spanish fleet was led by the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who
had no experience of fighting, either on land or sea, and was probably
appointed (as a late substitute for the Marquis of Santa Cruz who died in
February 1588) because Philip knew that Medina Sidonia would follow his orders
to the letter, and the last thing Philip wanted was a commander who would show
any initiative of his own.
Medina
Sidonia knew all along that he was the wrong man for the job, and pleaded with
Philip to be relieved from the responsibility. Apart from anything else, he
suffered badly from sea-sickness! However, his pleas were turned down, and it
is even possible that his letter to Philip was never shown to the King, because
his courtiers knew exactly what his response would be.
Indeed,
Philip’s main fault was his desire to micro-manage the whole affair. The plan
was Philip’s from the outset, namely to use the Armada to collect the 30,000
strong army of the Duke of Parma and sail it across the channel to England. Parma
had already suggested to Philip that he could do this without naval support,
relying instead on surprise, a fleet of lightly armed barges, and an expected
uprising by English Catholics, but he was overruled. He had no choice but to
wait for the Armada to arrive.
The
progress of the Armada
As
the Armada reached sight of England on 19th July, beacons were lit
that conveyed the news to London faster than any messenger could achieve; as
the hill-top watchers saw the distant light from a burning beacon they would
light their own so that it would be seen by the next in the chain.
As
it happened, Drake’s response was delayed not so much by an unfinished game of
bowls as by an unfavourable tide. Most of the English fleet was holed up in Plymouth Harbour, ready to pounce on the Armada
as it came into sight, but the low tide prevented this. The Spanish had an
opportunity to take advantage by blockading the harbour and attacking the
English ships when they emerged, but this idea was turned down because it did
not accord with Philip’s orders.
Instead,
the Armada was allowed to continue up the English Channel
with the English fleet, once the tide had turned, in pursuit. Several small engagements
took place, notably at Eddystone near Plymouth,
and off Portland Bill, but little damage was suffered by either side.
Two
Spanish ships managed to collide with each other and Drake, ever the
opportunist, decided to raid the crippled ships at night for whatever they might
have on board. However, this move led to other ships of the fleet not knowing
where he had gone and, when dawn broke, the fleet was completely out of
formation. It took a day for the ships to regroup, by which time the Armada was
out of sight. However, the greater speed of the English ships allowed them to
catch up.
The
most significant engagement on the way up the Channel occurred off the Isle of Wight, when the English fleet divided into four
squadrons and sailed towards the Armada ready for battle. However, Medina
Sidonia was afraid that his larger ships might be driven on to sand banks close
to shore and ordered them to escape to the open sea. He now had no choice but
to sail straight for the French coast at Dunkirk,
where he hoped that Parma’s
army was waiting.
However,
the Duke of Parma had problems of his own, and his army was far from ready to
embark and be escorted to England.
Apart from anything else, the 30,000 troops had been reduced to 16,000 by
disease, and Dutch vessels were blockading the port of Dunkirk.
The
Armada therefore had to wait offshore near Calais, anchored in a crescent formation.
Medina Sidonia now had a dilemma. Parma
wanted him to send part of his fleet along the coast to deal with the Dutch
blockaders, thus enabling the troops to make their way to the waiting Armada,
but Medina Sidonia was wary of weakening his fleet as the English approached.
It was a marine version of rock versus hard place.
As
it happened, the initiative now lay with the English, who used a trick that had
been used in similar situations in the past. This was to sacrifice eight of the
fleet’s ships as fireships, setting fire to them and letting them drift towards
the enemy at night. The effect of this tactic was mainly psychological, because
the Spanish had no idea whether the burning ships might not contain large
charges of gunpowder that would explode with devastating consequences. They did
not know that the English did not have that much gunpowder to spare.
The
result of the fireship attack was exactly what Howard and Drake intended,
namely that a number of Spanish ships cut their anchor chains and broke
formation to escape. No ships were actually set alight by the fireships, but
that did not matter. The Spanish now had no choice but to engage in direct battle
with the English.
The
Battle of Gravelines
The
Battle of Gravelines, on 29th July, was the decisive action of the
campaign, and was fought very much on English terms. The Spanish ships were not
prepared for a full-scale naval engagement but for an invasion, and this was
what led to their defeat. As it happened, they had plenty of ammunition for
their cannons, but were in little position to use it. For one thing, the gun
decks were so cluttered with stores that the guns could only be fired once, there
being no space to run them back far enough to reload. For another, the Armada
had more Catholic priests on board (for the expected forced conversion of England) than
trained gunners.
The
Spanish tactic was for the cannon to be fired once and the gunners then to man
the rigging in preparation for boarding the crippled English ships. However,
this would only be possible if the English ships got close enough, and the
English captains made sure that this did not happen.
Instead,
once the Spanish guns had fired their single shots, the English closed to a
range that enabled their guns to have maximum impact on the thick oak timbers
of the Spanish ships, especially when the ships heeled over and timbers were
exposed that were normally below the waterline.
Given
the tactics employed by each side, the Battle of Gravelines could only have one
winner, although it was the English who were forced to disengage when they ran
out of ammunition.
In
terms of ships lost, the number of Spanish casualties was not all that great,
given that only five ships were rendered unserviceable. However, many others
had been badly damaged and had to withdraw from the battle. Apart from the
fireships, no English vessels were lost. More than 600 Spanish sailors and
soldiers died, to fewer than 100 on the English side.
The
Armada escapes
With
the wind blowing from the south, the Armada had no choice but to escape
northwards, into the North Sea. There was now no chance of Philip’s plan being
put into action and, for the Spanish fleet, there was only one way home.
The
English chased the Spanish ships northwards as far as the Firth of Forth, so
that any thoughts of returning to the Spanish Netherlands were made impossible.
The English army force at Tilbury was reinforced in case any further attempts
were made at an incursion up the Thames Estuary, and it was therefore at
Tilbury that Queen Elizabeth made her famous victory speech on 8th
August.
The
Armada limped home, suffering far more losses than it had done during the
battle. Due to a navigational error it sailed much closer to the western coasts
of Scotland and Ireland than it should have done, and those ships that had
jettisoned their anchors in panic during the fireships attack were unable to
find shelter when the weather turned bad, instead being driven ashore and
wrecked on the rocks.
September
1588 was a particularly bad month for Atlantic storms which, combined with the
weak condition of many of the sailors due to disease and lack of food and
water, led to many of the Armada ships, particularly the smaller and lighter
ones, being lost. A number of Armada wrecks have been discovered in recent
years, with the contents giving evidence not only of the daily lives of Spanish
sailors and soldiers but of the supplies that were intended to support an
invasion force.
Some
Spaniards who were driven ashore did survive, and there are stories of
“Spanish-Irish” children being born during the following years. Only about
10,000 of the men who set out from Spain, and half the ships, returned there.
The
aftermath
Despite
this massive setback for Philip of Spain, the balance of power on the high seas
was little changed, with Spanish hegemony being scarcely dented. Most of the 22
galleons survived the battle and the Atlantic storms, and, after repair,
remained perfectly serviceable.
However,
English confidence was greatly boosted, as was the position of Protestantism in
England.
Above all, the role of the weather in deciding the issue was seen by many as
divine confirmation of the rightness of Elizabeth’s
rule and of the English Reformation. The phrase “He blew with his winds and
they were scattered” was inscribed on a victory medal and the storm was also
given the name of “the Protestant wind”.
Even
without the intervention of the elements, there is little chance that the
Armada could have succeeded, simply because the English people would surely
never have allowed themselves to be ruled by an autocratic (and Catholic)
Spanish monarch. Even if Queen Elizabeth had been overthrown and executed, it
is surely inconceivable that “King Philip of England” would have lasted very
long.
Why
the Spanish Armada was defeated
The
traditional view held by the British as to why the Spanish Armada failed in its
objectives was that the Spanish were out-fought and out-manoeuvred by Sir
Francis Drake and Lord Howard of Effingham, aided in no small measure by the
vagaries of the British weather. There is much to support this opinion, but it
is not the whole story.
Philip
had also deluded himself into believing that England was longing to return to
being a Catholic country, which it had not been since the death of Queen Mary I
(who was married to Philip) in 1558. However, that was 30 years ago, and the bulk
of the English population saw no reason to change. Those with long memories had
no desire for a savage regime similar to that of “Bloody Mary” with
anti-Catholics being burned at the stake.
England
under Elizabeth was entering a golden age, partly thanks to the overseas
enterprises of men like Drake and Raleigh, the latter of whom was trying to
establish a colony on the coast of North America, and which was to evolve into
the state of Virginia. The English (later British) Empire was in its infancy
and the future looked good. This gave the English pride and a sense of
independence that they had no intention of surrendering by making a backward
step. Philip had not taken this on board.
In
other words, the plan for the Armada was never going to work. Had the Armada
been able to collect the Duke of Parma’s troops and sail up the Thames with
them it would have been met with the full might of the English army, then
assembling at Tilbury, as well as being trapped by the English fleet that would
have followed them closely. Without any chance of reinforcement, the Spanish
soldiers would have stood no chance of victory.
Philip
knew all about Drake’s cleverness and ability to think quickly and decisively,
but he took no steps to counteract the threat. When given the opportunity to
blockade Drake’s fleet at Plymouth, Medina Sidonia did not take it because
Philip’s orders had been to race up the Channel as quickly as possible, thus
ensuring that Drake would be hard on his heels. Why did Philip not have a Plan
B to deal with such an eventuality? With part of the Spanish fleet preventing
Drake from leaving Plymouth, the rest of the Armada might have had a chance of
reaching their objective.
So,
what the Spanish had was a poor plan, poorly executed by inadequate leaders,
with their orders coming from a king in Spain who had no idea of what was
happening at the “sharp end”.
© John Welford